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AGRICULTURE AND SALINITY CONTROL
IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
B. DELWORTH GARDNER* and CLYDE E. STEWART**

INTRODUCTION
The focus of this paper is irrigated agriculture and salinity problems in the Colorado River Basin. Although complete analysis and
resolution of these problems requires consideration of sources of salt
other than irrigation, classes of pollutants other than salt, and other
nonagricultural water uses, it is infeasible to proceed so far within
the confines of this paper. Also, we do not presume to argue the
merits of irrigation development, although the value of additional
irrigation needs to be considered in appraising various salinity control
programs.
A. IrrigatedLand Use
The total irrigated acreage in the Upper Colorado Basin did not
change markedly from 1920 to 1955 and was around 1,400,000
acres. During the sixties, however, irrigated land in the Upper Basin
was in the neighborhood of 1,600,000 acres, including substantial
irrigated noncropland pasture and some land classed as idle irrigated.
The irrigated cropland acreage has increased greatly in the Lower
Basin in the last several decades to 1,225,000 acres. This increase has
been largely in the Phoenix-Tucson area based on ground-water
development. The irrigated acreage in the State of Arizona more than
doubled from 1940 to 1960. As a consequence, substantial depletions of the ground-water supply are occurring with concurrent
deterioration in water quality.
Much more land could be irrigated in both the Upper and Lower
Basins if water were available. The U.S. Soil Conservation Service has
classified the following as land "suitable" for irrigation:
*Chairman, Department of Economics, Utah State University. Another version of this
paper was presented at the symposium "Values and Choices in the Development of an Arid
Land River Basin," of the Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, San Francisco, Mar.
1974; Utah Agricultural Experiment Station Paper No. 1977.
**Agricultural Economist, Economic Research Service, United States Department of
Agriculture.
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Acres

Lower Basin
Upper Basin
Total

38,760,000
7,058,60
45,818,600

B. IrrigatedCrops
The Upper Basin is basically a forage-livestock economy. Relatively small acreages of fruit, sugar beets, beans, and vegetables are
important to selected areas. Overall, the irrigated cropland is used
largely for forage crops and feed grains. Nearly a fourth of the
"irrigated" land is in nonrotation, permanent pasture. About 1.1
million acres are in harvested crops of which 944,000 acres are in
forage crops.
About 58 percent of the irrigated acreage of 1,225,000 acres in
the Lower Basin is devoted to forage and grains. The remainder is
planted in highly intensive crops-cotton, vegetables, and citrus;
citrus and vegetables have low salt tolerances, while cotton is a high
tolerance crop.
A spectacular enlargement of the livestock feeding enterprise has
occurred in the Lower Basin in recent years. The average number of
cattle on feed in Arizona alone was 73,000 over the period 1945-54,
but by 1972 had grown to 600,000 head. This activity is significant
from the standpoint of crop production, water use, and water quality.
C. Salinity Levels
Limits of the salt tolerance of crops cannot be set in any absolute
sense, but the Salinity Laboratory of USDA has established a general
classification of the salinity hazard of irrigation water: 1
ppm
100-250
Low
250-750
Medium
750-2250
High
> 2250
Very high
Estimates show pristine water quality at Hoover Dam to be 330
ppm and above Imperial Dam to be 383 ppm. Present actual salt
content at Imperial Dam is around 850 ppm, suggesting sharp deterioration from pristine levels.
1. U.S. Salinity Laboratory, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Diagnosis and Improvement of
Saline and Alkali Soils 69-82 (USDA Agriculture Handbook No. 60, Feb. 1954).
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Salt contributions from irrigation and 30 major point sources in
1965-66 were estimated:2

Green Subbasin
Upper Main Stem
San Juan
Upper CRB
Lower CRB

Irrigation
tons/day
3528
5603
518
9649
1180
10,829

Pointsources
tons/day
363
2061
25
2449
1990
4439

Total salt load in the Upper Basin (1963-64) was 26,160 tons per
day. Fifty-two percent was contributed by overland runoff and
ground-water inflow. Of the remaining 48 percent, 37 percent came
from irrigated agriculture, 9 percent from natural point sources, and
2 percent from mining and industrial (M&I) uses. This amount of salt
was associated with a flow of 19,263 cubic feet per second (cfs)
which produces a salinity level increase of 499 ppm. The contribution of irrigation was about 185 ppm.
In the seven Colorado Basin states, nearly a third of the irrigable
lands are classified as saline. That is, the salt content in these soils is
sufficiently high to have significant impacts on crop production and
incomes.
The salinity estimates at Imperial Dam listed below suggest the
change that has occurred in the last 50 years. Presumably the changes
are attributable to increased irrigation and out-of-basin diversions.
But we understand that some question exists as to whether the
changes were actually as great as shown.
Pristine
1926-35
1941-68
1958-63
1941-68 modified 3
1965

ppm
383
619
751
787
865
839

Distribution of sources with some quality impacts of irrigation are
shown as follows:4
2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Mineral Quality Problem in the Colorado
River Basin (1971).
3. The modification is based on the assumption that recent irrigation projects were
operational during, the entire period, and appropriate adjustments are made in the figures.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program (1972).
4. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Quality of Water-Colorado River Basin (Progress Rep. No.
3, Jan. 1967).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Lee Ferry

[Vol. 15

Hoover Dam ImperialDam

1941-61

544

684

743

1941-61 modified

580

720

809

Salt pickup rates from irrigation return flows vary substantially
among areas. Among the high pickup rate areas identified is Grand
Valley, Colorado, where the rate is estimated at eight tons of salt per
year for each irrigated acre. EPA projected an average pickup of a
little less than two tons per acre per year in the Upper Basin on
several hundred thousand acres of new irrigation land projected to
the year 2010.
D. Costs of Salinity

An indication of the potential magnitude of the salinity problem
can be obtained from a study by the Colorado River Basin Water
Quality Control Project over the period 1960-1971 .
This study projected a Basin population of 8.5 million by 2010,
assumed no augmentation of water supply or shifts of water among
basins or areas, and assumed construction of the Central Arizona
Project. Further, the study projected an increase by 2010 of 425,000
acres of irrigated land above Hoover Dam. Increased acreages in the
Lower Main Stem Subbasin were more than offset by a projected
decrease in irrigated acreage in the Phoenix-Tucson area. Acreages of
vegetables and cotton were projected to increase relatively and, in
the case of vegetables, absolutely.
The above assumptions and projections led to the following water
quality values (ppm):
Year

1960

1980

CRB-Hoover Dam

697

876

990

CRB-Imperial Dam

759

1056

1223

2010

Penalty costs or effects of yield decrements in agriculture and
nonagricultural costs from increased hardness were estimated for the
Lower Basin and for Southern California. Total annual direct and
indirect (input-output study) costs at 1960 prices by 2010 were
estimated at $5.9 million in the Lower Main Stem, and $19.1 million
in Southern California. More than 80 percent of the costs were in
irrigated agriculture. Direct costs were about 60 percent of total
costs. These costs are increases over the base period, assuming no
remedial programs.
5. An Interindustry Analysis of the Colorado River Basin in 1960 with Projections to
1980 and 2010 (B. Udis ed. 1968); C. Stewert, Economic Impacts of Water Quantity and
Quality Constraints on Agriculture of the Colorado River Basin (1969); U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, supra note 2.
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These offsite costs are associated with new development and increased incomes and production in other areas. Their significance
attaches (1) as a trade-off with the new development, and (2) to the
evaluation of special control measures and programs to reduce the
quality impacts of new development.
E. Summary
Over the years, neither the market system nor the institutional
environment of the Colorado River Basin was conducive to prevention or retardation of water-quality deterioration. In fact, they have
been conducive to non-action. Only when the problem became
obvious as costs rose, did concern arise.
History has demonstrated a deterioration of quality with additional irrigation development and out-of-basin transfers of water.
This lower quality is partly a function of increased loading of salts. It
is also a function of less water as a result of productive use of water
supplies upstream. The total effects have not all been adverse. Costs
of more salt in less water downstream are associated with increased
output and incomes upstream and in out-of-basin areas.
We proceed next to a conceptualization of that part of the salinity
problem resulting from irrigation return flows. At least in part, however, our conceptualization may be quite appropriate for other nonirrigation sources of the problem.
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SALINE RETURN FLOWS
A. The Model
One fundamental reason for the salinity problem is the existence
of what economists call "negative externalities" arising out of irrigation itself. Crops valuable to society and to the farmer are produced
on saline soils. But as a consequence of irrigation, salts of the soil are
dissolved in the water which enter the river as return flows. This
saline water is then utilized in other areas down the river. The result
is higher production costs for downstream users (we restrict our
discussion to downstream irrigation) in the form of reduced yields
and needed changes in cropping patterns to more salt-resistant, but
profit-reducing varieties.
The irrigator upstream does not bear these increased costs imposed
on downstream users. Although it is not his intention to injure anyone, the water course is used as a free resource for disposing of the
dissolved salts which are produced along with the valuable crops. No
legal or market mechanism exists that incorporates the cost of this
salt in the price of the upstream crops. The upshot is that the social
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value (value to society) of the upstream irrigation is less than the net
private benefits from producing crops.
Let MNB (Figure 1) represent the marginal net private benefits of
using various quantities of irrigation water to produce crops on a
FIGURE 1.
Marginal damages and benefits of utilizing irrigation water
Dollars

0

representative acre of saline land. Assume an optimal level of irrigation technology and optimal cropping patterns and technical production conditions as seen from the viewpoint of the irrigator. Variable
production costs are subtracted from crop revenues yielding marginal
net benefits. The function MNB is negatively sloped because of the
conventional principle of diminishing marginal returns to increasing
quantities of water, assuming adequate water supplies and optimal
deliveries over the irrigation season. The function is presented as
linear, but in reality it may not be. The logic of the analysis holds so
long as it has negative slope.
MED (Figure 1) represents a schedule of marginal external damages inflicted on downstream users by diversions of increasing quantities of water upstream. These damages are related to two factors:
(1) Irrigation water consumptively used upstream cannot be available
to downstream users, and (2) the saline return flows impose higher
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production costs on downstream users. A priori, we would expect
that the greater the upstream diversions the greater the damages
downstream. MED may not be linear as presented, but a necessary
condition to the argument is that it have a positive slope.
MED does not enter the decision calculus of the upstream irrigator. If we assume he attempts to maximize his own net benefits, he
will extend his water use per acre to A' acre-feet where MNB is zero.
His total per acre net benefits is the area under the MNB curve. This
may be referred to as his private water "rent." The external damages
at that level of use are B dollars.
The socially-optimum position is Ae acre-feet where MED = MNB.
If the upstream irrigator uses less water than Ae acre-feet, the marginal net benefits accruing to him exceed the marginal external
damages imposed on others, and society benefits from expanding per
acre water use. If the upstream irrigator uses more than Ae acre-feet,
the reverse is true.
B. Options for Bringing Salinity Production Toward the Optimum
Let us assume that the American people wish to have the salinity
problem managed so as to maximize the total national economic
product from water use.6 Several options for salinity control will be
briefly discussed: (1) investment in water quality improvement, (2)
litigation brought by downstream users, (3) imposition of quality
standards, and (4) implementation of direct economic incentives to
improve quality.
1. Investment in Quality Improvement
This option is basically different from the others discussed. Investment to improve quality could leave both upstream and downstream
users better off, depending on the distribution of the costs of the
investment. The other options basically reduce the welfare levels of
one region while improving the welfare position of the other.
Investment in quality improvements could take many formsinvestment in off-farm desalination plants or other mechanical
6. An implicit assumption utilized in the analysis should be made explicit at this point.
We have assumed thus far in this section that a social optimum can be defined by an
"efficiency" criterion, i.e., an optimum situation will exist when the total value of the
economic product along the entire system is maximized. Social welfare may well be influenced by "equity" considerations as well, however; i.e., how the economic product is
distributed among water users along the system. If equity criteria are deemed relevant, social
welfare may be enhanced by permitting relatively low-income irrigators to utilize more
water, even if marginal external damages exceed net benefits and total economic product is
thus below a maximum. Thus, if both criteria are used to arrive at a social optimum, some
weighing of "efficiency" and "equity" must be done.
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devices to remove salt, investment in on-farm practices to reduce salt
in the return flows or in water-saving methods that would reduce
needed diversions and thus augment river flow downstream, and/or
investment to increase water supplies in the entire system or to alter
seasonal deliveries that would minimize the damages of given salt
loads. Obviously, investment in quality improvement can apply to all
forms and sources of pollution and may be about the only effective
alternative for reducing salinity from overland runoff and natural or
point sources.
Off-farm investment in developing new water supplies, in developing new storage facilities to improve the timing of deliveries, or in
reducing evapotranspiration losses by phreatophytes would shift the
MED curve to the right. Each level of water use by irrigators would
inflict less damage on downstream users than under present conditions. This implies also an increase in optimal water use upstream,
and thus both groups could be made better off. These investment
alternatives should be evaluated by the economic criterion that if
they produce more social benefits than their resource opportunity
costs, they should be undertaken. They can only very indirectly
contribute to the solution of the problem posed by Figure 1, however. Even though MED shifts to the right and the socially optimum
level of water use upstream increases, there will still be a discrepancy
between the social optimum Ae and the private optimum A' unless
the shift is very large. There is no incentive for the upstream irrigator
to act in a socially optimum manner. It is likely, therefore, that these
investment options can mitigate the damages caused by the externality problem, but cannot solve the problem by inducing the irrigators
to use the socially optimum quantity of water.
If the investment is made on-farm, and the irrigator bears the full
costs, the expected result would be a leftward shift of MNB as well as
a rightward shift of MED. If so, the private optimum will be less than
A' acre-feet, but the social optimum might be more or less than Ae
acre-feet, depending on the relative shifts of MED and MNB. The
result of the investment would probably move the private optimum
closer to the social optimum. But the irrigator would have no incentive to make the investment to hurt himself in order to aid downstream users. A good argument exists for public subsidy to pay for
the social improvement downstream. Any investment to improve
quality, whether on-farm or off-farm, should be undertaken if social
benefits exceed resource costs, and the distribution of the costs of
this investment should be as equitable as possible.
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2. Litigation.
It is generally true in our society that parties injured by actions of
other parties can bring damage suits in courts of law to recover their
losses. Downstream users could sue upstream irrigators and either
prevent them from producing wastes or force them to pay damages.
This is seldom done. Although their discussion applies mostly to
industrial polluters, Kneese and Bower's explanation applies remarkably well to irrigation waste as well: 7
(1) Adversary proceedings are a cumbersome procedure.
(2) Wide dispersion of damages makes it hard to bring suit for full
damages [wide dispersion of "damagers" make it doubly difficult].

(3) Waste discharge imposes costs in a highly variable fashion over
time.
(4) Damage may be irreversible.
(5) Legal standards of "reasonable" [damages] are notoriously

vague.
It is very difficult to see how an effective damage suit could be
brought by so many damaged parties against so many prior users.
Besides, as we argued earlier, the damages created by the return flows
are not an intentionally harmful act by the irrigators, but an accepted consequence of irrigation that is sanctioned by established
water rights, interstate water compacts, and international treaty.
3. Quality Rules and Standards
Crops and saline return flows are produced jointly in almost fixed
proportions. Because of the intricate and diverse plant, soil, and
water relationships in irrigation, however, return flows are very
difficult to monitor and assign to an individual irrigator. Therefore, it
is difficult to visualize how meaningful standards relative to return
flow could be applied to each irrigator. Perhaps they could be to a
given project or area. But then rules would have to be invoked that
limited irrigation to certain times when return flows would be less
salty or to the least saline soils. Restrictions could also be placed on
the crops that could be grown, or the water right altered to reduce
quantities diverted. Any of these actions would be costly to irrigators
and reduce their management flexibility. They would also require a
strong monitoring and enforcement agency. As still another alternative, irrigators may be forced to impose upon themselves investment
7. A. Kneese & B. Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions
85-86 (1968) (bracketed phrase supplied).
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in water saving practices or quality improving mechanical devices. In
terms of Figure 1, the MNB function would be shifted drastically to
the left. In theory, MNB might shift far enough so that the private
optimum would be at the previous social optimum Ae . But the social
optimum has also shifted to the left. Many of the private net benefits
upstream would be destroyed by employing such a standard, and this
option would be highly inequitable, as well, as upstream users would
bear higher costs in order to confer benefits downstream.
4. Economic Incentives
In recent years a sizeable literature has arisen on the issue of
whether or not externalities, such as those discussed here, can be
optimally regulated by negotiations between the injuring and the
injured parties. R. H. Coase demonstrated in his now classic article'
that this private bargaining would produce a socially optimal result,
providing transactions costs were zero. Potential gainers would pay
the polluters to reduce their pollution to levels that would make
both groups better off. Transaction costs could be small if the
number of negotiating parties is small. They most certainly would
not be small in the situation we are considering where the number of
irrigators causing the external damage, and those harmed by it number in the tens of thousands.' There is no conceivable way that they
could bargain individually to the socially optimal level of salinity and
water use.
Of course, possibilities may exist for representatives of groups of
individuals (say, state government officials) to bargain for their constituents. These bargaining decisions may well lead toward the
socially optimal position if all constituents are fairly represented and
a mechanism for making payments to alter pollution behavior could
be conceived and implemented.1 0 History, however, does not provide us with many examples of this kind of bargaining which have
been successful. Let us now turn to penalties that might be imposed
on irrigators or others that inflict external costs on others.
Perhaps the most straightforward type of economic sanction is a
user surcharge or tax on water use. If this surcharge were placed on
each unit of water diverted, the MNB curve of Figure 1 would shift
downward by the amount of the surcharge. Obviously, if the position
8. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
9. For a discussion of the inapplicability of the Coase solution where transactions costs
are high, see Kneese, Environmental Pollution: Economics and Policy, 61 Am. Econ. Rev.
153 (1971).
10. See McKean, Property Rights, Appropriabilityand Externalities in Government, in
Perspectives of Property 39 (G. Wunderlich ed. 1972).
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of MNB and Ae were known, the surcharge could be set at the level
which would produce a private optimum at Ae acre-feet of water use.
The irrigator would respond to this surcharge in those ways which
would affect his profit position least unfavorably. His management
would be more flexible in responding to a water surcharge than to a
water quality standard or quantity quota.
A tax surcharge on water utilized by Upper Basin irrigators would
mean that they would be required to bear the costs for providing
benefits to downstream users. This may be inequitable. The beneficiaries may be asked to help pay for these benefits. They could be
required to pay a higher price for higher quality water, and with the
proceeds a per acre lump-sum subsidy paid to the irrigators upstream.
Kneese and Bower report several instances where user charges have
been successfully used to control industrial waste in Winnipeg,
Canada, Springfield, Missouri, the Delaware estuary, and in the Ruhr
industrial area of Germany. 1 1 They point out that private firms
respond to these charges by changing production processes, improving management, and/or treating wastes. We know of no reason why
irrigators would not behave in the same way.
It may be necessary to tax water used on highly saline soils at a
higher rate, although this would be difficult to determine and enforce. Tietenburg has recently argued, however, that an
efficient set of taxes for waste control will change over time and
might be different for various firms, not only because the benefits of
a unit reduction of pollutant concentrations change over time and
the number of sources changes, but also because the relationship
among pollutants and waste products is governed by varying and
basically uncontrollable elements in nature. Hence, social efficiency
will not, in general, be achieved by temporally uniform tax rates.12
This comment would seem to apply to irrigation waste and suggests
that user surcharges (taxes) may need to vary over time as water
supply conditions change and over various irrigators if the taxes are
to be efficient.
SOME ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
While economics can specify conditions for optimality, the market
system does not automatically achieve these conditions. In fact, the
return-flow problem is a prime example where the market cannot
handle the problem. Nor does action to remove point sources of
11. Kneese & Bower, supra note 7.
12. Tietenburg, Specific Taxes and the Control of Pollution: A General Equilibrium
Analysis, 4 Q. J. Econ. 521 (1973).
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pollution or to alleviate salt concentrations from diffuse sources
come about by action in the private market. These are public problems that must be solved by public action.
The alternative futures noted below are program responses arising
from public action. The focus is generally on the Upper Basin. In a
general sense, the physical and hydrologic structure of the Upper
Basin is largely one of independent subbasin entities, so that the
quality output of one subbasin does not influence another subbasin.
Diversions out of the Upper Basin are usually in the headwaters so
that Upper Basin export areas are not greatly influenced by quality
deterioration from the irrigated area. Rather, the immediate impacts
of lowered quality are on the Lower Basin, Southern California, and
Mexico. Major U.S. users of water below Hoover Dam are offstream
and their actions are largely localized.
The status quo is hardly a viable alternative. Developments in the
Upper Basin will diminish the quantity of water to the Lower Basin
and undoubtedly lower the quality there in the absence of control
programs. The Central Arizona Project will substantially decrease the
supply of water at the international boundary.
As illustrations, we use several studies which have been made since
1960. These studies seem to have culminated in proposed legislation
for a single program which presumably has been agreed upon by
several federal agencies and by the respective states.
A. Colorado River Basin Water Quality Control Project
The assumptions and cost estimates of this comprehensive study
have been discussed earlier in the paper.' ' Eight salinity control
programs were analyzed: three salt-load reduction programs, four
flow augmentation programs, and one program to demineralize water
supplies at point of use. This study describes the water quality problem, estimates its present and potential economic dimensions, and
locates, describes, and evaluates possible control measures and associated costs. A major source of salt, Blue Springs in the Little Colorado Subbasin, is a basic element in these program formulations;
subsequently, however, the Department of the Interior concluded
that the Blue Springs program was not feasible.
The results of this study are a basic information source for consideration of water quality in the Colorado River Basin. The study is
also basic to subsequent studies and formulation of programs. However, rather than present more findings and conclusions of the study,
13. See text accompanying note 5, supra; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra
note 2, Udis, supra note 5; Stewert, supra note 5.

January 1975]

AGRICULTUREAND SALINITY CONTROL

we direct our attention to subsequent and more current studies and
proposals which might be viewed as modifications and applications
of the Water Quality Control Project Study.
B. U.S. Water Resources Council Studies 4
The U.S. Water Resources Council conducted a number of more
recent comprehensive river basin studies in the Upper and Lower
Basin.
1. The Upper Basin Study
The Upper Basin study group analyzed four alternative projections: (1) basic OBERS,' ' (2) regional interpretation (RI) of OBERS,
(3) states alternative 1, and (4) states alternative 2. Projected populations (1970 = 346,000) for 2020 ranged from 616,000 to 902,000,
respectively. Water depletions (3.4 million acre-feet in 1965) ranged
from 5.1 million (OBERS) to 8.1 million acre-feet (states-2). Only
alternatives (3) and (4) assumed oil shale development and less irrigation along with more people. Also, alternative (4) enlarged depletion
to 8.1 million acre-feet on the assumption that the Mexican Treaty is
a national obligation.' 6
Under the OBERS-RI projection of 500,000 acres of new irrigated
land, the salt concentration at Lee Ferry would increase by 2020
from 586 ppm to 820 ppm without, and 600 ppm with, an improvement program. The program viewed most favorably is largely on
irrigated land plus one stream diversion and one desalination project.
Capital costs by year 2000 were estimated at $230 million.
As indicated earlier, the OBERS and OBERS-RI projections did
not provide for oil shale development. State alternative I with 6.5
million acre-feet depletion included 1 million barrels per day by
2000 in Colorado and 0.5 million barrels by 2020 in Utah. State
alternative 2 would include 4 million barrels per day by 2020.
Recent actions suggest that oil shale development might get underway in the near future. At a magnitude of I to 4 million barrels per
day by 2020, water requirements with present processes would be
14. U.S. Water Resources Council, Upper Colorado Region Comprehensive Framework
Study (1971). A similar study and 18 subject matter reports were done for the Lower
Colorado Region.
15. The OBERS label attaches to the national-interregional projections program of the
U.S. Water Resources Council. The analyses were made by the former Office of Business
Economics (OBE-Commerce) and Economic Research Service (ERS-Agriculture). Thus,
OBE + ERS=OBERS. These projections were basic to the two regional studies. See U.S.
Water Resources Council, 1972 OBERS Projections (1972).
16. Selected acreage, water, and quality projections are shown in the table preceeding
note 20, infra.
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200,000-800,000 acre-feet diversions per year with net disappearance
50 percent of diversions.
2. The Lower Basin Study
The Lower Basin study centered primarily on two projectionsOBERS and modified OBERS-with the latter set, the primary focus.
Apparently both projections are optimistic and may be unrealistic
because augmentation of the present or prospective Basin water
supply would be necessary. The "modification" is based on an
assertion that OBERS did not fully recognize likely new development on Indian lands and in some ground-water areas.
Qualities projected in 2020 without a control program were 1050
ppm at Hoover Dam and 1350 at Imperial Dam. While not explicit
about a control program, the study showed "with program" salinity
levels in 2020 to 850 ppm and 1030 ppm at these two locations.
A large number of potential improvement measures were listed in
the Lower Basin. But the study group concluded that these measures
were mostly infeasible now for institutional, legal, and economic
reasons. The most promising measures are (1) reduction of evaporation, (2) vegetation management to increase water yield, and (3)
augmentation of supply through importation or desalination.
C. Proposed Legislative Programs
In 1972, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation set forth a 10-year water
quality program for the Colorado River Basin, 1 7 and in 1973 this
program was introduced in the U.S. Congress."s The basic policy
incorporated into the legislation was approved by the respective
states in April 1972 and by EPA on June 9, 1972. Public Law
93-320, the "Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act," was
approved by Congress June 24, 1974.1 9
The stated objective of this program is to maintain salinity concentrations at or below levels now found in the Lower Main Stem of the
Colorado River. This goal views the salinity problem as basinwide.
The present modified quality at Imperial Dam is 865 ppm.
Comparisons of the Water Resources Council (WRC) and Bureau
of Reclamation (BR) studies are shown below. Briefly, the BR proposal is for less new land, less new water depletions, and higher
quality downstream.
17. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, supra note 3.
18. S. 1807, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
19. 88 Stat. 266, 1974 U.S. Code Cong & Ad. News 1685. Title II of the Act is essentially the same as S. 1807, 93d Cong., 1st sess. (1973), supra note 18.
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New IrrigatedLand
(acres)

WRC Type I Studies

Upper Basin
Lower Basin

BR Program

500,000'
358,0002

350,140
88,640

Water depletions
(million acre-feet)

Total

New

New

Upper Basin
Lower Basin

6.5
4.8

2.1
0.9

1.9
.3

Water Quality
(ppm)
Lee Ferry
Hoover Dam
Imperial Dam

Program3
W/out
With
820
1050
1350

Program
W/out With

600
850
1030

..

..

12504

845'

'Regional Interpretation-OBERS.
'Modified OBERS.
3Year 2020.
4 Year 2000.
Stabilized after 1990.

Public Law 93-320 authorizes construction of the Paradox Valley,
Grand Valley, Crystal Geyser, and Las Vegas Wash salinity control
units as the initial stage. 0 Completion of planning reports on other
point, diffuse, and irrigation units listed is authorized. Irrigation
source control areas include Lower Gunnison, Uintah Basin, Colorado River Indian Reservation, and Palo Verde Irrigation District.'
1. Point Source ControlProjects

These projects are all above Hoover Dam. Their characteristics are:

LaVerkin Springs
Little Field Springs
Glenwood-Dolores Springs
Paradox Valley
Crystal Geyser
(oil test well)
Blue Springs
20. Pub. L. No. 93-320, § 202.
21. Pub. L. No. 93-320, § 203.

Salt
tons/yr.

Program
reduction
tons/yr.

Effect at
HooverDam
ppm

100,000
30,000
500,000
200,000

100,000
30,000
200,000
180,000

- 6
- 2
-15
-14

4,000
550,000

4,000
-

-

1
-

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

Blue Springs on the Little Colorado in Arizona, is a major source
of salt. The study did not recommend a program there because the
springs are (1) a source of 160,000 acre-feet of water, or half the
Little Colorado, (2) inaccessible, and (3) adjacent to Indian artifacts.
The total program would reduce salt concentration by 38 ppm at
Imperial Dam. Water losses would also be incurred, however.
2. Diffuse Source Control
These projects pose difficult data and control problems, but they
are all listed in the Act.' 2 These areas are heavy contributors of salt.
To achieve a reduction of 32 ppm apparently would require substantial costs and losses of water.
Flow
acre-feet

Salt
tons

Salt
removal
tons

Water
Effect at
loss
Imperial Dam
acre-feet
ppm

Price River

74,000

240,000

100,000

25,000

- 8

San Rafael River
Dirty Devil River
McElmo Creek
Big Sandy River

95,000
72,000
31,000
30,00

190,000
200,000
115,000
180,00

30,000
NA
NA
NA

-

302,000

925,000

Totals

90,000
80,0001
40,0001
80,000'
390,000

7
7
3
7

-32

'Method not shown.

3. IrrigationSource Control
Point and diffuse source proposals would achieve a reduction of
70 ppm at Imperial Dam. This places the major reduction burden on
irrigation-335 ppm of a total program of 405 ppm. Investments,
economic sanctions, standards and rules, educational programs, legislation, and other institutional arrangements would be extensive and
complex.
The goal of the scheduling and farm management program would
be to reduce salt loading from irrigation return flows. This would be
accomplished by minimizing the quantity of water that enters the
ground-water regime where saline formations are contacted.
Irrigation efficiency may be increased by (1) proper and timely
irrigation applications without more labor, (2) additional labor
inputs, and (3) improved on-farm systems and total distribution
systems through capital investment. Improved scheduling and management of farm irrigation would require a substantial increase in
informational and operational programs as well.
22. Pub. L. No. 93-320, § 203(a)(1)(iii).
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A major obstacle to this program is the institutional structure of
Western water laws. "Water savings" may diminish water rights if less
water is diverted through time. Increased irrigation efficiency in use
of a given quantity diverted may not only reduce water deliveries
downstream, but the return flows will likely be more saline. Only
interstate compacts that specify both quantity and quality of deliveries can adequately protect all water users. So far, we don't have
such compacts.
Point and natural runoff sources which are a major segment of
quality effects, present a different potential than irrigation return
flows in terms of control, solutions, and responsibilities. Point and
natural sources of salinity relate generally to the public and public
agencies, and control thus does not impair private property rights. In
contrast, irrigation return flows and associated salinity largely involve
private farmers and effective control presents a different set of problems. Most importantly, all salinity sources involve offsite or external
relationships and effects, which give rise to extremely complicated
questions of responsibility, water rights, net economic and social
impacts, and institutional and other arrangements for corrective
action.
D. Costs and Cost-Sharing
In benefit-cost analysis terminology, the problem of offsite or
external effects is one of incidence of the benefits and costs of the
external effect itself and the corrective action. If the beneficiaries of
economically feasible corrective action can be identified, an equitable distribution of the costs would relate cost allocation to benefits
received.
Capital expenditures in the 1972 program were estimated at
Substantial funding would be needed also for
$400-500 million.2
investigations, feasibility studies, educational programs, etc. The
report recommended that costs be "shared by the beneficiaries."
Differences of opinion no doubt exist as to who the beneficiaries are
and how much they benefit.
The legislation relies on federal responsibility to Mexico along
with federal land ownership and federal pollution control policy to
justify allocating 75 percent of the total costs as nonreimbursable.
The remaining 25 percent would be allocated between the Upper and
Lower Basin Development Funds with the allocation dependent on
benefits, causes of salinity, and availability of revenues in the funds
with an upper limit of 15 percent to the Upper Basin Fund.2 4
23. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, supra note 3.
24. Pub. L. No. 93-320, § 205(a).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Clearly, the economic or environmental optimum levels of salinity
at Hoover Dam or Imperial Dam have not been established. The
proposed 850 ppm salinity level at Imperial Dam seems to be more
of an historical coincidence than a scientifically based optimum.
Apparently this goal was set at a point in time when someone decided that the level of quality should not deteriorate further at this
location.
Quality goals and programs appear to have been settled without
adequate research foundations in economic and institutional feasibility analyses. The irrigation return flow problem seems particularly
lacking in data, analysis, and synthesis. In our opinion, we simply do
not yet know what is the optimum level of water quality in the Basin
at various locations. What levels can be achieved? What programs are
economically feasible and institutionally possible?
It is clear that if the present salinity of 850 ppm at Imperial Dam
is to be maintained or reduced, a heavy burden will be placed on
future agricultural development. Corrective action will be especially
costly to farmers in upstream areas unless incentives are provided.
This control program is also by far the most complex one to implement. Inducements or enforcements leading to farmer and irrigation
district action would seem to be necessary.
One major problem is the conflict between developmental and
environmental interests, whether real or imagined. The Water Resources Council Principles and Guidelines propose project objectives
both to enhance national economic development and to enhance
quality of environment. Which is consistent with a quality level of
850 ppm at Imperial Dam? Should this level be the reference point,
or should a broader look be taken? What are the tradeoffs between
these two objectives as the quality is increased or decreased from this
level? This broader look is difficult as long as Upper and Lower
Basins are viewed largely as independent economies. At this point in
time, the prevailing view seems to be that new development that
deteriorates quality must be offset by quality control programs by
the new developers or by their neighbors. It ought to be at least
considered that downstream users bear part of the cost of upstream
quality control.
There is some hope in some quarters that water importation in
major quantities is possible. The WRC study in the Lower Basin
clearly assumed this, but the more recent Bureau of Reclamation
proposal is based on substantially less new irrigation development
and water depletions.
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Although we have largely avoided discussing the recent water quality agreement between the United States and Mexico, it is quite
obviously a crucial issue in resolution of water quality problems in
the Colorado River Basin if it is taken seriously. The Basin states are
holding to the view that the international agreement is a national
problem and that they can proceed independently with development.
It is difficult to see how the agreement can be met without regard to
Basin development.
In many ways this paper has attempted to report the present
status of the water quality problem. We have also discussed in principle various policy options that might be considered in coping with
the problem. We have attempted to survey the relevant literature. In
the end, we are impressed that many more research results are required if our planning and policies are to match our hopes for
success.

In the first place, there must be a synthesis of the economics and
hydrology of the Basin as a whole. We see no way that a socially
optimum level of water quality can be estimated without giving
empirical content to the marginal net benefit and marginal external
damage functions of Figure 1. At this point in time we have more
hydrologic and water quality information than economic. Studies
that show the value productivity of irrigation water in the Upper
Basin and the value productivity of various levels of water quality in
the Lower Basin must be given top research priority.
We also need hard economic data on the costs and expected benefits of alternative programs to improve quality. Many government
agencies seem to be proceeding with quality improvement as if it
were obvious that the benefits will exceed the costs. It is our opinion
that public and congressional support for these programs would be
more easily obtained if it were clear that they are economically
feasible.
Finally, there are great gaps in our knowledge in assessing the
institutional workability of the various policy options to control
salinity. We have suggested alternatives that have been employed
elsewhere without firm evidence that they could be successfully
applied to the Colorado River Basin. A great deal of attention should
be given to organizational arrangements that would permit negotiation between Upper and Lower Basin states. Perhaps some kind of
regional authority or basinwide conservancy district is needed. How
the costs of quality-improving investment and institutional improvement should be distributed between Upper Basin irrigators and
Lower Basin beneficiaries is also a problem of first priority.

